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COMMENTARY
PSYCHIATRY, INSANITY, AND THE





Andrew Jackson may never have dared John Marshall to enforce
his decision in Worcester v. Georgia, I but the legend that has grown up
around that episode teaches a useful lesson about the fragile author-
ity of the Supreme Court. The Court, like the Pope, has no divi-
sions. It has, in Alexander Hamilton's words, "neither force nor will
but merelyjudgment." 2 Thus, the impact of its rulings depends not
only upon their fidelity to principle, but also upon their effective
implementation in the face of public opposition and our general ig-
norance about precisely how the world works.
This is far from an academic question. Many of the Court's de-
cisions have been intensely controversial.3 In some instances, the
* The author thanks Kevin McMunigal, Dr. Phillip Resnick, Dr. Stuart Youngner,
Daniel Polsby, Robert Lawry, Paul Giannelli, Lewis Katz, and Edward Mearns for their
comments on an earlier draft. They are not responsible for remaining errors and
shortcomings.
* * Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. J.D., Northwestern
University, 1981; A.B., Brown University, 1969.
1 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See G. GUNTHER, CONSTrrTUTIONAL LAw 25 (11th ed.
1985); 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 219 (1926).
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961)(emphasis
omitted).
3 The most prominent contemporary illustration is the Court's abortion jurispru-
dence. Compare, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 & n.1 (1982) with, e.g., id. at 453-
59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) and Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973).
Energetic dispute also has surrounded its rulings in criminal procedure. E.g., Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda was controversial when it was decided
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reaction has included outright defiance. 4 On occasion, opponents
have succeeded in overturning objectionable rulings by constitu-
tional or statutory amendment.5 These situations involve hostility
to judicial orders. Sometimes, however, the problem results from
inability rather than unwillingness to comply.6 Although it is often
assumed that difficulties of implementation arise primarily in com-
and remains so today. See, e.g., Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417
(1985); Inbau, "Playing God'" 5 to 4, 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 377
(1966). See generally L. BAYER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS (1983).
4 Perhaps the most notable modern example of defiance was the reaction in much of
the South to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court addressed this
phenomenon in several subsequent cases. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391
U.S. 430, 435-39 (1968); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). See generally G. ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTON OF SOUTHERN
EDUCATION 15-22, 210-19 (1969); S. WASBY, A. D'AMATO & R. METRAILER, DESEGREGA-
TION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER 162-222 (1977)4 For discussion of the atmosphere in
defiant communities, see, e.g., J. SILVER, MISSISSIPPI: THE CLOSED SOCIETY (1964);
Frankel, The Alabama Lawyer, 1954-1964: Has the Official Organ Atrophied?, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1243 (1964).
Another continuing controversy has involved officially mandated prayer in public
schools, which at least in theory was outlawed by Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962),
and School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), but which has continued unabated in
manyjurisdictions nonetheless. See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). See gener-
ally K. DOLBEARE & P. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS 29-35, 41-45, 72-86
(1971); Beaney & Beiser, Prayer and Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schempp on the Polit-
ical Process, 13 J. PUB. L. 475, 486-91 (1964); Birkby, The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt:
Tennessee Reaction to the "Schempp" Decision, 10 MIDWESTJ. POL. ScI. 304, 307-08 (1966).
5 Several constitutional amendments were adopted in response to unpopular
Supreme Court decisions. For example, the eleventh amendment overruled Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); the sixteenth amendment overruled Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); and the twenty-sixth amendment over-
ruled Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
The latest statutory change designed to vitiate a controversial Court ruling is the
Civil Rights Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 56 U.S.L.W. 45 (1988), adopted as
this Commentary went to press to overturn Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555
(1984). Other recent examples include: the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. app. § 1374(c) (West Supp. 1988)), en-
acted in response to United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477
U.S. 597 (1986); the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)), enacted in response to General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); and section 5(a) of the Government in the Sunshine
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241, 1247 (1976)(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)
(1982)), in which Congress rewrote Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act in
response to Administrator, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
6 For instance, during the Vietnam War, the Selective Service System failed to im-
plement United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), and various other legal require-
ments in large measure due to its inability to direct the discretion of local draft boards.
See L. BASKIR & W. STRAUSS, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE 70, 78-79 (1978);J. DAVIS, JR.
& K. DOLBEARE, LrrrLE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS 80-87 (1968); Field, Problems of Proof in
Conscientious Objector Cases, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 870, 892-904 (1972); Rabin, A Strange Brand
of Selectivity: Administrative Law Perspectives on the Processing of Registrants in the Selective Ser-
vice System, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1005, 1016-23 (1970).
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plex institutional reform litigation,7 the question inheres in many
more traditional legal contexts.8
The recent decision in Ford v. Wainwright 9 exemplifies the am-
biguous relationship between declaring and implementing the law.
In Ford, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment forbids
the execution of a capital defendant who becomes insane while on
death row.' 0 At first blush, Ford was an easy case. After all, the
prohibition against putting an insane prisoner to death has vener-
able roots in Anglo-American law. Beginning in the seventeenth
century, commentators such as Coke, Hale, and Blackstone dis-
cussed this prohibition as if it were a settled principle. 1 At the time
of the Ford decision, every American state accepted that principle. 12
Accordingly, the formal ruling was deceptively narrow: it merely
prohibited ex parte sanity determinations. 13
On closer examination, however, the matter is not so simple.
Psychiatrists almost certainly will be asked to assist in evaluating the
sanity of death row inmates. 14 Psychiatric judgments are inherently
imprecise. 15 Moreover, the sanity determination in a Ford-type
claim involves the highest possible stakes: whether a prisoner lives
7 See, e.g., D. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
8 See Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institttional Litigation,
93 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1980).
9 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
10 Some analysts have characterized the problem as one of inmate incompetence
rather than insanity. They have done so in order to avoid any misunderstandings that
could arise from the connotations of the word "insanity." See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIM-
INALJUSTICE § 7-5.6 commentary (proposed draft 1987). The author refers to the con-
cept as "insanity" because that is how the Supreme Court framed its discussion in Ford.
Any reader so inclined should feel free to substitute "incompetence" and "incompe-
tent" for "insanity" and "insane" wherever these terms appear.
11 For excerpts from common law treatises, see Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-08; Solesbee v.
Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 17-19 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
12 Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 & n.2.
13 Id. at 413-15. The process at issue in Ford provided for gubernatorial determina-
tion of sanity. Under the applicable state law, the governor would appoint a panel of
psychiatrists to prepare a report based upon a joint examination of the prisoner. The
statute did not expressly provide for the submission of evidence or arguments on behalf
of the inmate, and the governor followed a consistent policy of forbidding such evidence
or arguments. The governor did not indicate whether he would consider the prisoner's
post-examination submissions. Id. at 412-13.
14 The Ford Court did not consider the necessity of psychiatric participation in sanity
determinations. Both the state and the prisoner in Ford relied upon the findings of psy-
chiatrists. Id. at 402-04. Even if psychiatrists were not required to participate, other
medical or mental health professionals almost surely would be involved. Many of the
problems discussed in Part III of this Commentary with respect to psychiatrists also will
arise for psychologists, nurses, social workers, and other experts. See Note, Medical Ethics
and Competency To Be Executed, 96 YALE LJ. 167, 185 (1986).
15 Psychiatric evaluations have been described as calling for "basically subjective
judgment," Ford, 477 U.S. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
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or dies. Thus, the qualitative nature of psychiatric judgments, to-
gether with the enormous and immediate consequences of the san-
ity determination, could combine to increase the risk of unreliable
psychiatric opinions in every Ford-type case. The Supreme Court in
Ford explicitly declined to define precisely the constitutionally re-
quired procedures for resolving sanity disputes. 16 Yet for that rul-
ing to have more than rhetorical impact, resolution of death row
sanity disputes will require considerable procedural formality.
The logic of the Court's recent due process rulings suggests
that we should incur the burdens of that formality only if we accept
the cogency of the rule against executing insane persons. The rule's
ancient vintage notwithstanding, the justifications for exempting the
insane from capital punishment remain problematic. Continued ad-
herence to the rule, along with its elevation to constitutional status
in Ford despite its analytical infirmities, implies a profound societal
ambivalence about the death penalty. On the one hand, we are un-
willing to abolish capital punishment. On the other, we hesitate to
execute more than a handful of prisoners. This ambivalence in turn
suggests that the death penalty has become more a symbol of oppo-
sition to crime than a meaningful criminal sanction.
judgment), and as representing "at best a hazardous guess however conscientious,"
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 23 (1950)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
16 477 U.S. at 416-17. The Court also did not consider whether the same procedural
requirements should apply to initial and successive insanity claims. The prospect of an
inmate's repeatedly making false claims of insanity has troubled the Court for many
years. See id. at 429 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in
part); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1950); Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398,
405-06 (1897). Little or no empirical evidence exists that prisoners have repeatedly filed
frivolous insanity claims. See Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently
Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REv. 765, 790-91 (1980). That situation could change, however,
if more inmates seek sanity determinations in the wake of Ford.
The Court's concern in this area has two bases. First, death row inmates appear to
have nothing to lose in advancing "entirely spurious claims of insanity." Ford, 477 U.S.
at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Uneasiness over such claims reflects doubt over
whether they can be exposed. Research on this problem is limited, although some meth-
ods for dealing with feigned mental and emotional disturbance have been suggested. See
Resnick, The Detection of Malingered Mental Illness, 2 BEHuv. Sci. & L. 21 (1984). Second,
seriatim claims present special problems in the Ford context. The disposition of a prior
insanity claim logically cannot preclude a subsequent one because Ford requires that the
prisoner be sane at "the very moment of execution." 477 U.S. at 429 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part). Of course, if that standard were
taken literally, it could never be satisfied because, as a practical matter, the sanity deter-
mination must be made at some point prior to execution. Hazard & Louisell, Death, the
State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REv. 381, 400 (1962).
For further discussion of unresolved procedural and substantive issues, see infra
notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
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II. INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
The question of a defendant's mental condition may arise at any
stage of the criminal process. In Ford, the issue appeared only after
the prisoner had been tried, convicted, and placed on death row. In
other contexts, a defendant may claim to have been insane at the
time of the offense or to have become insane before trial. Just as the
common law forbade the execution of an inmate who became insane
while in prison, it also made special provision for insane defendants
at these earlier stages. For example, insanity at the time of the of-
fense traditionally has relieved the accused from legal responsibil-
ity. 17 This general rule excuses those persons whose antisocial
conduct is insufficiently blameworthy to justify a finding of guilt.' 8
Similarly, insanity at the time of trial requires a delay in the proceed-
ings until the defendant regains mental competence.19
The principal controversy over insanity has concerned the ap-
propriate definition of the concept. 20 The standard for insanity at
the time of the offense has been formulated in various ways, includ-
ing the classical M'Naghten rule, which excuses from criminal liability
a defendant who, as a consequence of a mental disease or defect, did
not know that his conduct was wrong;21 the so-called "irresistible
impulse" or "lack of control" test, which excuses a defendant who
had a mental disease or defect which prevented him from control-
ling his behavior; 22 the "product" rule, which excuses a defendant
whose conduct was the product of a mental disease or defect;23 and
the "substantial capacity" test, which essentially combines and up-
17 This principle arose from the common law. The Constitution apparently does not
require recognition of the insanity defense. See State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 998-1002
(Mont. 1984). Contra Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931)(per curiam);
State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
18 See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 9-22, 220-26 (1967).
19 See Hazard & Louisell, supra note 16, at 381-82; Note, supra note 16, at 783. The
requirement of competence to stand trial now rests upon constitutional due process
guarantees, not simply the common law. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
20 "Rivers of ink, mountains of printer's lead, forests of paper have been expended
on this issue .... " Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514,
516 (1968).
The definitional question is not, however, the only controversial topic in this field.
For example, the consensus over the continued recognition of the insanity defense has
begun to dissolve in recent years. See, e.g., N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
29-87 (1982).
21 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). See
generally A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, at 45-66.
22 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897). See generally A. GOLD-
STEIN, supra note 18, at 67-79.
23 See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overrued,
United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(en banc). See generally A. GOLD-
STEIN, supra note 18, at 82-86.
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dates the M'Naghten rule and the "lack of control" test.24 The stan-
dard for competency to stand trial also has been variously phrased,
but the alternative formulations focus upon the defendant's ability
to understand the charges and proceedings against him and to con-
sult rationally with his counsel. 25
In short, there is no single legal definition of insanity. Different
standards apply both at different stages of the criminal process and,
from one jurisdiction to another, at the same stage. The same doc-
trinal untidiness exists in the Ford-type context. States previously
had adopted varying standards of insanity for death row inmates. 26
Furthermore, the Ford Court left open the standard by which in-
sanity would be determined. 27 In principle, however, implementing
the rule against executing insane persons presents the same chal-
lenges regardless of the definition of insanity.28
III. PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE SANITY OF DEATH Row INMATES
Sanity is a legal, rather than a medical, concept. Sanity deci-
sions therefore involve normative questions, not scientific ones. Ac-
cordingly, those determinations are vested in judges, jurors, or
other lay decisionmakers. Nevertheless, psychiatrists inevitably play
a prominent role in sanity proceedings. They examine the person
whose mental condition is at issue and report their findings to the
decisionmaker.29
Psychiatric participation in capital cases poses special problems
24 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985) (excusing from criminal responsibil-
ity a defendant who, at the time of the offense, "as a result of mental disease or defect
... lack[ed] substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law"). See generally A. GOLD-
STEIN, supra note 18, at 86-88.
25 See, e.g., 'Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)(per curiam)(test is
whether defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a rea-
sonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as a
factual understanding of the proceedings against him"); State ex rel. Davey v. Owen, 133
Ohio St. 96, 104, 12 N.E.2d 144, 148 (1937)(test is whether defendant "has sufficient
mental capacity to recall the events of his life so that he can furnish to his counsel facts
which ought to be stated and presented to his jury at his trial for the crime charged").
See generally H. UVILLER, THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INVESTIGATION AND ADJUDI-
CATION 780 (2d ed. 1979).
26 See Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 35, 60-61, 101-07 (1986).
27 477 U.S. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
28 For further discussion of the appropriate criterion of insanity in this context, see
infra note 97.
29 See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 18, at 97-105. The proper scope of psychiat-
ric testimony in sanity proceedings has generated increasing debate. Compare Morse,
Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1984) and
Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L.
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due to the possibility that the defendant ultimately will be put to
death. As members of the medical profession, psychiatrists are
bound by the Hippocratic Oath to do no harm to their patients. For
this reason, both the American Medical Association and the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association have adopted policies precluding their
members from "participat[ing] in a legally authorized execution."30
These policies do not, however, bar psychiatrists from taking part in
earlier stages of capital cases, such as evaluating a defendant's
mental state at the time of the alleged offense or assessing an ac-
cused's competence to stand trial.3 1 The proscription does not ap-
ply in these situations due to the attenuated connection between
psychiatric involvement and actual execution.3 2
Cases like Ford, in which an inmate arguably has lost his sanity
while awaiting execution, present the participation dilemma directly
and unambiguously. The inmate in such cases already has been
convicted and sentenced to death. A finding of sanity therefore
could lead inexorably, and relatively quickly, to execution. Psychia-
trists could become involved in Ford-type cases at three stages:
(1) in evaluating a claim that a prisoner under sentence of death has
become insane; (2) in treating a death row inmate who has been
found to be insane; and (3) in certifying that a previously insane
death row inmate has regained sanity.
The first stage, assessing the condition of a prisoner who claims
to have become insane while awaiting execution, presents the weak-
est ethical conflict. Yet even here the case for psychiatric participa-
tion is far from clear-cut. A psychiatric evaluation at this stage could
lead to a finding of insanity, which would at least temporarily pre-
vent the state from taking the prisoner's life. On the other hand, a
finding that the inmate was sane could be the final step leading di-
rectly to the inmate's execution. From this perspective, the psychia-
trist's certification of sanity might be seen as an immediate cause of
the prisoner's death.
Psychiatric participation in the other stages is more problem-
atic. In the second stage, one might justify treating a death row in-
REV. 971 (1982) with Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Crimi-
nal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427 (1980).
30 Note, supra note 14, at 175 (quoting Capital Punishment, 1980 PRoc. HOUSE DELE-
GATES AMA 85, 86; AM. PSYCHIATRIC A., THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS
§ 7(1)(1985)).
31 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
32 For example, even if a psychiatrist were to find that a defendant was sane at the
time of the offense or competent at the time of trial, the defendant still could be acquit-
ted. Similarly, if he were convicted, the defendant could receive a sentence less than
death.
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mate who has become insane on the basis that mental illness itself
can cause great suffering. According to this view, psychiatrists have
a medical duty to treat such illness, regardless of the legal implica-
tions of successful treatment. On the other hand, this approach
holds out the grisly prospect that the state will restore the prisoner
to health only so that it can kill him.3 3 Once again, the treating psy-
chiatrist could be viewed as an immediate cause of the inmate's
death.
The third stage, determining whether a previously insane death
row inmate has regained sanity, resembles the first, but the similar-
ity is deceptive. As in the initial stage, a finding of insanity results in
the postponement of execution, whereas a finding of sanity could
lead directly to the inmate's death. At the same time, there is a sig-
nificant difference between the first and third situations. Certifying
a death row inmate as sane in the first situation simply continues the
status quo because the inmate is presumed sane at that stage.34 By
contrast, certifying a death row inmate as sane in the third situation
changes the status quo because the inmate already has been found
insane in an earlier proceeding. At this stage, a finding of sanity
could be "tantamount to imposing a new death sentence."' 35 Thus,
the psychiatrist might be viewed as more clearly implicated in the
execution in the third situation than in the first.
Psychiatrists could resolve these issues in several ways.36 Those
33 This possibility has been characterized as "an arrangement in which psychiatrists
clear the tortured minds of capital prisoners so that the state can fill their bodies with
electricity." The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, 100 HIARv. L. REv. 100, 107 (1986). One way
to avoid that prospect would be to commute the sentence of any death row inmate found
to have become insane while awaiting execution. Applebaum, Competence to Be Executed:
Another Conundrum for Mental Health Professionals, 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 682,
683 (1986); Radelet & Barnard, Ethics and the Psychiatric Determination of Competency to Be
Executed, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 37, 49 (1986); Ward, supra note 26, at 91;
Note, supra note 14, at 186. No such requirement exists under current law, however.
Ford, 477 U.S. at 425 n.5 (Powell,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Only one state appears to have left open the possibility of commuting a death sentence
when a prisoner becomes insane. Note, supra note 14, at 171 n.22 (citing MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-19-202 (1985), which authorizes a court to "suspend" the death sentence
when "so much time has elapsed since the commitment of the defendant that it would be
unjust" to carry out the execution).
34 The prisoner bears the burden of proving that he has become insane while await-
ing execution. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 417; id. at 426 & n.6 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); id. at 429 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the result in
part and dissenting in part). For fuirther discussion of the extent of the burden of proof,
see infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
35 Radelet & Barnard, supra note 33, at 49.
36 For more detailed discussion of alternative resolutions of these ethical issues, see
Applebaum, supra note 33, at 682-83; Radelet & Barnard, supra note 33, at 45; Ward,
supra note 26, at 84-87, 90-92.
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who adopt what might be characterized as the scrupled approach
would refuse to evaluate or treat death row inmates at any stage.3 7
They view any involvement in this process as inconsistent with, and
threatening to, their medical role.38
Those following the intermediate approach take a more complex
view. With respect to assessment, they would evaluate the extent of
the inmate's mental impairment without offering a formal conclu-
sion as to sanity. 39 Even this involvement would be conditioned
upon the availability of a professionally adequate environment for
the psychiatric examination and a subsequent adversarial proceed-
ing which affords sufficient protection to the prisoner's interests. 40
With respect to treatment, followers of this approach would treat
only inmates who give informed consent.4 1 Some within this camp
would further condition their provision of treatment upon the com-
mutation of the death sentence to eliminate the possibility of execu-
tion if the prisoner were to regain his sanity. 42
Finally, those following the clinical approach would participate
fully in both assessment and treatment.43 Two quite different
groups of psychiatrists take this position. One group sees no special
37 Some commentators characterize this approach as "principled." Radelet & Bar-
nard, supra note 33, at 45; Ward, supra note 26, at 85. Attaching that label to this ap-
proach could imply that advocates of other approaches to these issues are somehow
"unprincipled." The term "scrupled" has the additional virtue of consistency with the
Supreme Court's terminology in its discussion of the problem of prospective jurors who
have reservations of various kinds about capital punishment. See, e.g., Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 514 (1968).
38 Applebaum, supra note 33, at 683; Radelet & Barnard, supra note 33, at 45; Ward,
supra note 26, at 85. For a recent restatement of the arguments supporting the scrupled
approach, see Ewing, Diagnosing and Treating "Insanity" on Death Row: Legal and Ethical
Perspectives, 5 BEHAV. Sc. & L. 175, 181-85 (1987).
39 Radelet & Barnard, supra note 33, at 45; Ward, supra note 26, at 86-87. One com-
mentator who adheres to many aspects of the intermediate approach has argued that
psychiatrists face no ethical dilemma in simply evaluating an inmate's mental state be-
cause that type of involvement does not implicate the healing role of the psychiatrist.
Note, supra note 14, at 177.
40 Applebaum, supra note 33, at 682-83; Radelet & Barnard, supra note 33, at 45-48.
41 Applebaum, supra note 33, at 683; Radelet & Barnard, supra note 33, at 49. A
prisoner who has been found insane presumably would lack competence to give in-
formed consent to treatment. Applebaum, supra note 33, at 683. Even if an insane pris-
oner could give informed consent, he also might be entitled to refuse treatment. See
Ward, supra note 26, at 92-99.
42 The Human Rights Advocacy Committee at a Florida mental institution took this
position in the case of a convicted murderer who was committed for treatment after
being found incompetent for execution. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 33, at 49; Ward,
supra note 26, at 91; Note, supra note 14, at 179-80. As previously stated, however, the
law does not now require commutation upon a finding of insanity. See supra note 33.
43 For a recent discussion supporting the clinical approach, see Mossman, Assessing
and Restoring Competency to be Executed- Should Psychiatrists Participate?, 5 BEHAv. Sci. & L.
397, 402-07 (1987).
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ethical conflicts in Ford-type cases. Its members view the assessment
of sanity in this setting as analogous to tasks that they routinely per-
form in other phases of the criminal process and see the treatment
of mentally ill death row inmates as their professional duty; the pos-
sibility that the prisoner will be executed does not matter. The
death penalty from this perspective is a legal, not a medical, issue.44
The other group follows this approach for more pragmatic rea-
sons. Its members oppose, to a greater or lesser extent, the death
penalty itself. They would participate, however, for two reasons.
First, their involvement could lead to at least a temporary stay of
execution. For those who abhor capital punishment, anything that
keeps a prisoner alive is a positive development. 45 Second, if oppo-
nents of the death penalty refuse to participate, they will leave the
entire field to those psychiatrists who have fewer reservations about
capital punishment.46 Supporters of this approach justify their con-
cern with critical references to several psychiatrists who regularly
testify for the prosecution in death penalty cases.47 Allowing gov-
ernment-oriented psychiatrists to go unrebutted could lead to more
executions, an eventuality which persons in this group would view
with dismay.
This second pragmatic argument for anti-death penalty psychia-
trists to participate in Ford-type cases recognizes-indeed, rests
upon-the inevitably imprecise nature of psychiatric judgment. In
essence, the argument runs, a psychiatrist's assessment of an indi-
vidual's mental state is influenced to a degree by the psychiatrist's
views on the underlying issue. A psychiatrist who opposes capital
44 Applebaum, supra note 33, at 682, 683; Radelet & Barnard, supra note 33, at 45;
Ward, supra note 26, at 87, 90-91. Some persons in this group may have no particularly
well-defined views on the death penalty. For example, the National Medical Association
takes no position on capital punishment, but urges its members to assess and treat pris-
oners in order to fulfill their responsibilities as medical professionals. Applebaum, supra
note 33, at 683; Ward, supra note 26, at 86. Others may, in fact, support the death
penalty. For purposes of the discussion in the text accompanying this footnote, the dis-
tinction between those who are neutral about and those who are in favor of capital pun-
ishment has no special significance.
45 See Ward, supra note 26, at 86.
46 See Radelet & Barnard, supra note 33, at 45; Ward, supra note 26, at 85.
47 SeeJ. RoBrrsCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 198-207 (1980); Rappeport, Ethics
and Forensic Psychiatry, in PSYCHIATRiC ETmICS 255, 269-70 (S. Bloch & P. Chodoff eds.
1981); Radelet & Barnard, supra note 33, at 47, 52 n.37. One particular psychiatrist, Dr.
James Grigson, has come in for particularly harsh criticism. Dr. Grigson has testified for
the prosecution in several dozen capital cases, in all but one of which the defendant has
received a death sentence. Ewing, "Dr. Death "and The Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychiatric
and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 8 AM. J.L. &
MED. 407, 410 & nn.9-10 (1983). One writer has suggested that Dr. Grigson works "at
the brink of quackery." Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerousness, " Psychiatric Testimony, and
Professional Ethics, 5 Am.J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977).
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punishment is somewhat more likely to detect signs of insanity in a
prisoner than is one who either favors the death penalty or has no
strong feelings on the issue. Conversely, a psychiatrist who favors
the death penalty is somewhat less likely to detect signs of insanity
in a prisoner than is one who opposes the death penalty.48
Up to a point, this pragmatic argument captures an important
truth. Psychiatry is "not... an exact science," 49 but rather a field of
"subtleties and nuances." 50 Its practitioners often deal with "elu-
sive and deceptive symptoms."'51 Thus, it should come as no sur-
prise that psychiatrists "disagree widely and frequently" 52 when
called upon to contribute to legal proceedings. These disagree-
ments arise more from the nature of the discipline, which has given
rise to literally hundreds of competing methodologies and schools
of thought, than from venality or bias. 53
The Supreme Court could have responded to the inherently im-
precise nature of psychiatry by forbidding the use of evidence pro-
vided by its practitioners as unreliable. It has not done so. Instead,
and of special relevance to this discussion, the Court has specifically
approved psychiatric participation in capital cases. In so doing, it
has emphasized the need for adequate testing of psychiatrists' find-
ings and opinions through an adversarial process. 54  Indeed,
although the precise content of this requirement was a source of
disagreement among the Justices,55 the Court rested its decision in
48 See, e.g., Bolsen, Strange Bedfellows: Death Penalty and Medicine, 248 J. AM. MED. A.
518, 519 (1982); Radelet & Barnard, supra note 33, at 45; Ward, supra note 26, at 85.
49 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985).
50 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979).
51 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950).
52 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985). But see Rogers, Bloom & Manson, In-
sanity Defenses: Contested or Conceded?, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 885 (1984)(finding consen-
sus among prosecution and defense psychiatrists in approximately 80% of cases in
which the insanity defense succeeds).
53 See, e.g., Resnick, Perceptions of Psychiatric Testimony: A Historical Perspective on the Hys-
terical Invective, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHiATRY & L. 203, 209-10 (1986).
54 See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77-87 (1985); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 896-903 (1983).
In Ake, the Court held, precisely because of the lack of consensus within the disci-
pline, that an indigent defendant in a capital trial is entitled to a court-appointed psychi-
atrist upon a showing that his sanity at the time of the alleged offense will be a significant
issue. The court-appointed psychiatrist would enable the defendant to offer expert re-
buttal to the prosecution's psychiatric evidence. 470 U.S. at 81-84.
The Barefoot decision allowed the prosecution to introduce psychiatric evidence on
the defendant's future dangerousness. This holding rested upon the defendant's oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the state's experts and to provide his own contrasting expert
testimony. 463 U.S. at 898-901.
55 FourJustices suggested that some form of cross-examination is essential, Ford, 477
U.S. at 415 although the plurality stopped short of requiring "a full trial on the issue of
sanity," id. at 416. Three others, in two separate opinions, suggested that much less
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Ford upon the complete exclusion of the prisoner from the sanity-
determination process. 56
Greater procedural formality has its costs, however. The Court
has made clear in diverse contexts, including its recent death pen-
alty jurisprudence, that those costs should weigh heavily in defining
the scope of constitutional guarantees.57 The pragmatic argument
suggests that the costs of adversarial procedures in Ford-type cases
could be quite substantial. In essence, it encourages psychiatrists
who oppose or have reservations about the death penalty to partici-
pate in such cases to offset the views of their prosecution-oriented
colleagues, some of whom engage in possibly dishonest practices to
promote death sentences. 58 If this argument leads pragmatists to
participate on behalf of prisoners, an appreciable number could
shade their opinions to compensate for the questionable practices of
various government psychiatrists. Thus, the argument implies that
a disturbing proportion of all psychiatric opinions in Ford-type pro-
ceedings will be incorrect due to bias. Furthermore, much of that
bias will be entirely unconscious. 59
We do not, of course, know how many psychiatrists fit within
each of the philosophical camps described above. It is clear, how-
formal procedures would suffice. Id. at 425-27 (Powell, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in thejudgment); id. at 429-30 (O'Connor, J., joined by White, J., concurring in
the result in part and dissenting in part).
56 Id. at 413-15; accord id. at 424 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 429-30 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in
part).
57 The concern over the burdens of complex litigation may explain the Court's ap-
parent retreat in recent years from the implications of its death penalty rulings in the
1970s. E.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412 (1985); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939
(1983); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
See Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305, 307.
The emphasis upon costs also occupies a prominent place in modern procedural
due process cases. E.g., Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,
321-34 (1985); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680-82 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976). Costs are not the only consideration in procedural due
process cases, of course. In Eldridge, the Court outlined a three-factor calculus for
resolving such controversies: the private interest affected, the incremental gain in accu-
racy from more formal procedures, and the resulting additional burdens placed upon
the government as a result of those procedures. Id. at 335. The individual interest in
any death penalty case is as great as one could imagine: life itself. Nothing in the dis-
cussion that follows should be interpreted as denigrating that interest.
58 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
59 Cf. R. ROSENTHAL, EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (1966)(ex-
ploring impact of psychological researchers' working hypotheses upon their reported
findings); R. ROSENTHAL & L.JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM (1968) (analyzing
effect of teachers' prior beliefs concerning students' intellectual aptitude upon those
students' educational achievement).
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ever, that the debate over the propriety of psychiatric assessment
and treatment of inmates awaiting execution has intensified in re-
cent months. 60 This debate apparently will not end soon. The
American Psychiatric Association, after extended deliberation stim-
ulated by the Supreme Court's ruling in Ford, has found itself unable
to adopt an official position concerning the ethical acceptability of
diagnosing and treating death row prisoners. 6 1
We also cannot be sure how much subconscious shading of psy-
chiatric opinions will occur. It bears repeating that most disagree-
ments between psychiatrists will arise in good faith.6 2 Nevertheless,
there is reason to believe that the problem of shading will not be
trivial. Various writers have noted that psychiatrists with strong per-
sonal beliefs on controversial issues sometimes allow those beliefs
to affect their professional opinions. For example, psychiatrists op-
posed to the Vietnam War were more likely than others in their field
to sympathize with and assist young men seeking to avoid military
service. 63 Similarly, psychiatrists who favored more permissive
abortion regulations in the period before Roe v. Wade" tended to
find mental health indications for abortions in individual cases more
often than did psychiatrists who favored restrictive abortion
policies.65
One might dismiss the potential unreliability of psychiatric
opinions in Ford-type cases on the theory that bias-related errors will
be randomly distributed. Because the mistakes will balance out, the
aggregate number of insanity claims upheld would be correct de-
spite the errors in particular instances. Unfortunately, we cannot
tell whether the assumption of random distribution will prove valid.
In any event, regardless of the validity of this assumption, the argu-
60 Compare Ewing, supra note 38, at 181-85 (advocating the scrupled approach) with
Mossman, supra note 43, at 404-07 (advocating the clinical approach).
61 Roth, APA Council Reports: The Council on Psychiatry and Law, 144 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY
411, 412 (1987).
62 See supra text accompanying note 53.
63 See, e.g., L. BASKIR & W. STRAUSS, supra note 6, at 45-46, 47-48. Psychiatrists were
not unique among health professionals. Similar patterns have been documented for
physicians and dentists. Id. at 42-47.
64 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65 See Rosen, Psychiatric Implications of Abortion: A Case Study in Social Hypocrisy, 17 W.
RES. L. REv. 435, 438-40, 444-46 (1965). See also D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE
AND MORALITY 59-61, 141 (1970); G. GRISEZ, ABORTION: THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES,
AND THE ARGUMENTS 77-78, 81-82, 245-47 (1970); L. LADER, ABORTION 34-35 (1966).
Cf Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens and Benefits, Hard Cases and Some Bad
Law, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 978, 990-91 n.57, 1016 n.159 (1981)(discussing the claim that a
proposed post-Roe distinction between elective and therapeutic abortions was illusory
because sympathetic physicians would find the requisite medical necessity in many in-
stances in which no genuine health justification for abortion existed).
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ment overlooks the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis upon ele-
vated procedural reliability and genuinely individualized factfinding
in capital cases. 66 Thus, this matter cannot be ignored.
The law could respond to the problem of erroneous sanity de-
terminations in particular Ford-type proceedings in three ways.
First, the prisoner might be required to make a very significant
threshold showing of insanity simply to obtain a hearing.67 Of
course, an extremely high threshold could result in the summary
rejection of a substantial number of meritorious insanity claims.
Such a rigorous standard might result in a skewed pattern of errors
in which the number of valid claims that are mistakenly rejected will
substantially exceed the number of invalid claims that are mistak-
enly accepted. 68 Yet a large excess of false negatives over false posi-
tives would frustrate Ford's rule against executing inmates who have
become insane while on death row.
Second, the prisoner could be called upon to prove insanity by
more than the traditional "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard.69 The highest plausible burden of proof would seem to be
"clear and convincing evidence," the standard which federal law re-
quires an accused to satisfy in order to establish an insanity defense
at trial.70 Again, however, the higher the standard, the greater the
probability of mistaken denials of insanity claims. That result also
66 See, e.g., Mills v. Maryland, 56 U.S.L.W. 4503, 4508 (June 6, 1988); Spaziano v.
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 456 (1984); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983);
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 873-80 (1983); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05
(1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976). But see Weisberg,
supra note 57, at 320-21, 343-60 (suggesting that these decisions actually require far less
rigorous procedures in capital cases than their rhetoric implies).
67 See Ford, 477 U.S. at 417; id. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
68 It is somewhat misleading to talk about "valid" and "invalid" claims. No consen-
sus has emerged concerning the proper definition of insanity in the criminal law, see
supra Part II, and the Ford decision did not attempt to resolve this issue, see 477 U.S. at
422 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The appropri-
ate test depends to a considerable extent upon the rationale for the rule exempting the
insane from execution. See infra note 97.
69 The inmate has the burden of proof when asserting a claim of insanity. See supra
note 34.
70 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (Supp. IV 1986). This statutory provision has been upheld
against constitutional challenge. United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574, 1575-76
(11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Amos, 803 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1986).
Requiring the prisoner to show insanity "beyond a reasonable doubt" seems en-
tirely inappropriate. That standard protects individuals by imposing the risk of errone-
ous decisions almost entirely upon the government. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 428 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 372 (1970)(Harlan, J., concurring). Placing so heavy a burden upon a prisoner
would stand the rationale for the "reasonable doubt" standard on its head by imposing
the risk of error almost entirely upon the individual.
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would effectively undermine the apparent purpose of the Ford
decision.7 1
Finally, the law could provide for careful inquiry into the bases
for psychiatric opinions in order to ferret out bias or dishonesty.
That necessarily implies the use of some form of relatively rigorous
cross-examination, which in turn suggests a fairly formal hearing.7 2
The prospect of mini-trials in Ford-type cases could pose a daunting
challenge to the legal system. As Justice Frankfurter observed more
than a generation ago, "the onset of insanity while awaiting execu-
tion of a death sentence is not a rare phenomenon."73 Nearly two
thousand inmates are now on death row in this country, and the
number is steadily increasing.74 Even if only a minority raised in-
sanity claims, a substantial number of hearings would be required to
determine the sanity issue and to resolve questions of possible psy-
chiatric bias. 75
The value of this additional burden on the legal system is not
entirely self-evident. The sanity problem in a Ford-type matter dif-
fers significantly from the psychiatric questions at issue in the earlier
phases of a capital case. A Ford claim necessarily arises after convic-
tion and sentencing. These facts imply that the prisoner was sane at
the time of the offense and competent during the trial. Under these
71 The law could, of course, hold the inmate to the traditional "preponderance"
standard or even to a more generous "substantial evidence" test. The latter would re-
quire only a sufficient showing to withstand a directed verdict. Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,477 (1951). It is exceedingly unlikely that anyjurisdiction would
adopt this standard, however. All of the opinions in Ford endorsed procedures designed
to prevent the erroneous success of false claims rather than to facilitate the accurate
recognition of valid ones.
72 Only a plurality of the Ford Court was willing to endorse such a requirement. See
supra note 55.
73 Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). An im-
pressionistic estimate suggests that approximately half of all death row inmates in Flor-
ida become insane at some point during their confinement. Sherrill, In Florida, Insanity Is
No Defense, 239 THE NATION 537, 555-56 (1984)(quoting director of Florida Clearing
House for Justice). For a detailed review of clinical and other studies of the stress of
imprisonment on death row, see Ward, supra note 26, at 38-47. See also Note, supra note
14, at 172 nn.28-30.
74 See Bruck, On Death Row In Pretoria Central, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 13 & 20, 1987,
at 18, 18-19.
75 The absolute number of hearings in Ford-type cases might seem small as compared
to the number of hearings on claims of incompetency to stand trial or insanity at the
time of the offense. Nevertheless, the administrative burden of Ford hearings will not be
insignificant for at least two reasons. First, the stakes in such situations-whether the
prisoner lives or dies-are uniquely high. Second, death row inmates are concentrated
in a small number ofjurisdictions. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 135-37, 140 (1986); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLE-
TIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1986, at 1 (1987) [hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1986].
Those jurisdictions can expect to confront a relatively large number of Ford-type claims.
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circumstances, society has established its right to sanction the pris-
oner.76 During the earlier phases, by contrast, the accused stands in
a much stronger position. He cannot be convicted if he was insane
at the time of the offense and cannot be tried if he is not competent
to stand trial.77 Hence, the legal system and society as a whole
should bear the real costs of resolving, in a relatively formal way, the
psychiatric issues which arise in the earlier phases. Unless we un-
derstand the reasons for exempting the insane from execution, how-
ever, it is more difficult to justify the costs of resolving the
psychiatric issues in Ford-type cases.
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR THE RULE AGAINST
EXECUTING INSANE PERSONS
The justification for incurring the extra costs of ferreting out
psychiatric bias depends upon why society should refuse to execute
inmates who have become insane while on death row. Six different
rationales have been proposed to explain the development and per-
sistence of the rule against executing insane persons. None is en-
tirely cogent.
A. EXCULPATION
An insane prisoner who receives a temporary reprieve might
think of some argument that would exonerate him or persuade the
authorities not to execute him.78 This theory, however, proves too
much. Given enough time, any death row inmate might think of
such an argument.79 Logically, therefore, this rationale does not
justify staying the execution of only insane prisoners. Instead, it
supports the outright abolition of capital punishment.
Even if there were some basis for special dispensation for the
insane, the likelihood that such an inmate actually would propound
a decisive argument seems "vanishingly small." 80 The typical death
sentence receives extensive post-trial review. This review generally
includes direct appeals to the state courts and often to the United
States Supreme Court, as well as collateral attacks in both state and
federal forums. These steps normally precede any Ford-type in-
sanity claim, a fact which suggests the remoteness of the prospect
76 See Ford, 477 U.S. at 425 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment); id. at 429 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).
77 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
78 See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *396; 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
34-35 (1736).
79 See, e.g., Hazard & Louisell, supra note 16, at 383-84; Ward, supra note 26, at 49-50.
80 Applebaum, supra note 33, at 683.
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that an insane prisoner will recall something that counsel, friends,
and family had overlooked.8 ' Moreover, one need not have litigated
a death penalty case to appreciate the special hostility with which
many courts regard last-minute attempts to forestall executions.8 2
Such courts may reject almost summarily even a meritorious new
argument advanced at the eleventh hour. Hence, the exculpation
theory seems to be a questionable basis for sparing the insane
inmate.
B. PROPORTIONALITY
Insanity itself is sufficient punishment, so executing an insane
prisoner is an excessive sanction.8 3 Unfortunately, existing law re-
futes this rationale. The insane prisoner gains only a temporary re-
prieve; the inmate can be executed upon recovery of his faculties.8 4
Proportionality therefore cannot explain the rule.
C. DETERRENCE
The execution of an insane prisoner will not discourage other
persons from committing capital crimes.8 5 This theory, of course,
assumes that the death penalty has some general deterrent value, a
point of intense and longstanding controversy.8 6 Let us grant that
assumption for the moment, however. To maximize general deter-
rence, we should make no exception for the insane. By following
this course, society would be telling all potential criminals that they
will be executed if they commit a sufficiently heinous offense, no
81 See Ford, 477 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). See also M. GUTrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 434 (1952).
82 See, e.g., Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 380 (1984)(Powell, J., concurring);
Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109, 112 (1983)(Burger, CJ., concurring); Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887-88 (1983).
83 See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at *395.
84 See supra note 33. Of course, the prisoner would never be executed if he became
permanently insane. In this situation, therefore, the proportionality theory retains its
vitality. Reliable data on the relative incidence of permanent and temporary insanity on
death row do not exist, although some anecdotal evidence suggests that many prisoners
suffer intermittent episodes of insanity while awaiting execution. See, e.g., Sherrill, supra
note 73, at 555-56.
85 See, e.g., E. COKE, THIRD PART OF THE INSTrrIuTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6
(1797); Remarks on the Trial of Charles Bateman By Sir John Hawles, Solicitor-General in the
Reign of King William the Third (1685), in 11 STATE TRLLS 474, 477 (T. Howell ed. 1811)
[hereinafter Hawles].
86 For detailed summaries of the arguments on deterrence, see, e.g., F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, supra note 75, at 167-86; Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the
Moral Bases of the Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1196-224 (1981).
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matter what happens to their mental state while on death row.8 7
The rule against executing someone who becomes insane in prison
leaves open the possibility that a lawfully imposed death sentence
will not be carried out. That possibility encourages prospective per-
petrators of capital offenses to consider the likelihood of escaping
execution after being sentenced to death, just as they presumably
assess the likelihood of avoiding apprehension and conviction. In
short, exempting the insane from execution undermines whatever
deterrent effect the death penalty affords. 8 Thus, this rationale also
is inadequate.
D. HUMANENESS
Executing an insane person is inhumane.8 9 This theory neces-
sarily implies that it is somehow more humane to wait until the pris-
oner can understand his situation than simply to take his life without
waiting for his sanity to return. 90 Many persons would find this a
dubious proposition. If the death penalty is barbaric, it should not
be imposed upon anyone. Justice Traynor characterized the idea of
sparing only the insane from execution as "inverted humanitarian-
ism" resting upon "a curious reasoning that would free a man from
capital punishment only if he is not in full possession of his
senses." 9' 1 Hence, humaneness does not support the rule.
E. THEOLOGICAL
An insane prisoner should not be executed because he cannot
87 See M. GUTrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 81, at 436; Radelet & Barnard,
supra note 33, at 40.
88 The argument in the text might prove too much. If our only goal were to maxi-
mize deterrence, perhaps we should favor the summary execution of all suspected
wrongdoers. Of course, the criminal law has other goals, including rehabilitation, inca-
pacitation, and retribution. These goals can be at least partially satisfied through the
imposition of sanctions less drastic than death. Moreover, the Constitution affords crim-
inal defendants numerous rights which permit some guilty offenders to go free.
Although respect for those rights undoubtedly also undermines deterrence, no serious
commentator has advocated the repeal of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth amend-
ments.
In a more realistic vein, the possibility of commutation or clemency also may be said
to undermine the deterrent effect of the death penalty by leaving open the prospect of
gubernatorial action forestalling execution. Under current conditions, however, this
prospect is more theoretical than real. No governor has acted to prevent a scheduled
execution since the death penalty was reintroduced a decade ago. See F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, supra note 75, at 126-28, 144-46.
89 See, e.g., E. CoKE, supra note 85, at 6.
90 See M. GurrMACHER & H. WEXHOFEN, supra note 81, at 435.
91 Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal. 2d 144, 159, 208 P.2d 668, 676-77 (1949)(Traynor, J.,
concurring).
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prepare for death by making peace with the Almighty. 92 This ap-
proach has the virtue of acceptance within some religious traditions.
On the other hand, not all religious groups believe that ultimate
destiny depends upon one's mental or emotional state at the mo-
ment of death. 93 Thus, the theological approach is only partially
persuasive at best.
F. RETRIBUTION
The effectiveness of punishment depends upon the moral
equivalence between the sanction and the offense, an equivalence
which is lacking when society executes an insane prisoner. 94 In such
an instance, the prisoner cannot appreciate the relationship between
his crime and his death. Accordingly, the inmate will not suffer in
anticipation of his demise. 95 This argument has received more sup-
port from modem commentators than any other.96 Yet the retribu-
tion theory presents problems of its own. This argument, like the
exculpation theory, may prove more than its proponents intend.
Any prisoner who lacks the capacity to comprehend the connection
between his offense and his impending execution may well lack the
capacity to comprehend the connection between his offense and any
lesser punishment. The retribution theory thus calls into question
the propriety of imposing any sanction at all upon insane inmates.
In short, none of these rationales is entirely persuasive; some
cannot be cabined short of complete abolition of capital punish-
ment.9 7 Perhaps these theories had greater force in earlier times
92 See, e.g., Hawks, supra note 85, at 477; Musselwhite v. State, 215 Miss. 363, 371, 60
So. 2d 807, 811 (1952).
93 See Hazard & Louisell, supra note 16, at 387-88. One writer has suggested, without
analysis, that the theological theory might run afoul of the establishment clause. Ward,
supra note 26, at 51. None of the opinions in Ford alluded to any such problem, although
two opinions, including that of the Court, implicitly approved the theological theory as a
basis for a constitutional rule against executing the insane. See 477 U.S. at 407, 409; id.
at 419 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment). Even if the ques-
tion were squarely presented, the Court might reject an establishment clause attack on
the ground that the rule against executing the insane "is deeply embedded in the history
and tradition of this country." Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
94 See, e.g., Hazard & Louisell, supra note 16, at 386-87; Ward, supra note 26, at 54-55;
Note, supra note 14, at 168 n.5.
95 See Ford, 477 U.S. at 421-23 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Hazard & Louisell, supra note 16, at 386-87; Radelet & Barnard, supra note
33, at 39-40; Ward, supra note 26, at 54-56. Cf. H. UVILLER, supra note 25, at 780 (sug-
gesting that similar reasoning underlies the requirement that a criminal defendant have
the ability to understand the charges and proceedings against him in order to be compe-
tent to stand trial).
96 See, e.g., Feltham, The Common Law and the Execution of Insane Criminals, 4 MELB. U.L.
REV. 434, 468 (1964); Ward, supra note 26, at 56.
97 In addition to the difficulties with each of the theories discussed in the text, no
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than they do today. For example, a theological rationale might have
convinced those who lived in seventeenth-century England, when
religious faith played a more central role in public affairs than it
does in our comparatively secular age. They might also have found
the deterrence theory less troublesome during a period in which
substantially more executions took place each year in London and
Middlesex alone than have occurred in the entire United States dur-
ing the past two decades. 98
However that may be, the uneasiness of the contemporary case
for refusing to execute the insane suggests the difficulty ofjustifying
the added costs of determining sanity and screening out possible
psychiatric bias in Ford-type proceedings. Our continued adherence
to the exemption implies that we must look elsewhere to understand
its persistence.
V. THE PERSISTENCE OF THE RULE
The Supreme Court in recent years has shown a marked aver-
sion to recognizing legal rights the vindication of which will impose
substantial costs upon the judicial system.99 The implementation of
the rule against executing insane prisoners could impose such costs.
If it ii taken seriously, the resolution of sanity disputes could require
very elaborate procedures. Despite the potential complexity of im-
plementing the rule, the Court now has elevated it from common
law to constitutional status.
One might dismiss the rule as a cynical device to obscure the
state's absolute power over its citizens. 00 To be sure, the rule
consensus exists concerning the definition of insanity. See supra notes 20-27 and accom-
panying text. The definition that applies, however, should bear some logical relation-
ship to the rationale for the rule against executing insane prisoners. Thus, for example,
if the exculpation theory were deemed to justify the rule, the standard of sanity should
include the ability of the prisoner to propound an argument that would lead to exonera-
tion of the crime or commutation of the sentence; if the retribution theory were viewed
as the basis for the rule, the standard should require only that the inmate understand the
connection between the offense and the ultimate punishment of death. See, e.g., M.
GurrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 81, at 436; Hazard & Louisell, supra note 16, at
394-95; Ward, supra note 26, at 63-68; Comment, Criminal Law--Constitutional Lau-Exe-
cution of Insane Persons, 23 S. CAL. L. REV. 246, 256 (1950).
98 Between 1607 and 1616, the average annual number of executions in these parts
of England was 140. Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in D. HAY, P. LINE-
BAUGH, J. RULE, E.P. THoMPsON & C. WINSLow, ALBION'S FATAL TREE 17, 22 n.3 (1975).
By contrast, only 68 persons were executed in the United States between 1977 and
1986, the latest year for which official statistics are available. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
1986, supra note 75, at 1. The last American execution before 1977 occurred in 1967. F.
ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 75, at 26, 30, 35.
99 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 57.
100 See The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, supra note 33, at 106.
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might yet be eviscerated through the imposition of stringent eviden-
tiary burdens or the adoption of informal procedures which would
make it extraordinarily difficult for a prisoner to prevail on an in-
sanity claim. 10' Yet a curt dismissal overlooks a more plausible ex-
planation for the rule's persistence: the rule has endured because it
serves an important social function.
The functional analysis starts from an apparently curious fact.
Although the Supreme Court has declined to invalidate the death
penalty on constitutional grounds, only a tiny fraction of the hun-
dreds of persons on death row have been executed. 10 2 This relative
paucity of executions and the elaborate procedural requirements
applicable in capital cases suggest a profound societal ambivalence
on the subject. That ambivalence affects both the judges who must
enforce laws which produce intense moral dilemmas and a public
which seems to want some executions, but not too many.' 03
The evidence for this analysis admittedly is equivocal, but it is
intriguing. The Supreme Court, despite its rejection of most consti-
tutional challenges,10 4 has shown no real enthusiasm for the death
penalty. Several justices have expressed support for legislation to
end executions even as they denied the propriety of judicial aboli-
tion of capital punishment.' 0 5 The Court's recent retreat from the
careful scrutiny of death sentences stems more from apparent frus-
tration at the magnitude of the task than from renewed support of
execution. 106
Public opinion is similarly uncertain. At the broadest level, sur-
101 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
102 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 75, at 96; Weisberg, supra note 57, at 387
n.294.
103 See Weisberg, supra note 57, at 384-86.
104 One exception to this pattern was the decision that the death penalty for the rape
of an adult woman, and presumably for the commission of other nonhomicidal crimes,
violates the eighth amendment. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
105 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.* 238, 375 (1972)(Burger, CJ., joined by Black-
mun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); id. at 405-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor, the only member of the Court to have had the opportunity to vote on
such legislation, was one of the principal authors of the Arizona statute which reinstated
the death penalty after the Furman decision. See Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on thejudiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1981). Neverthe-
less, she once wrote a separate opinion concurring in the invalidation of a death
sentence on a ground not expressly raised in the petition for certiorari. See Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-19 & n.* (1982)(O'Connor, J., concurring). See also En-
mund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 827-31 (1982)(O'Connor, J., dissenting)(rejecting view
that death is unconstitutionally disproportionate sanction for felony murder but sup-
porting remand of case for new sentencing proceeding at which all relevant mitigating
evidence would be properly considered).
106 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 75, at 46; Weisberg, supra note 57, at 307,
387-88.
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vey research reveals widespread support for capital punishment. 10 7
When the question moves from the abstract to the specific, however,
the situation becomes more cloudy. Substantially smaller percent-
ages favor mandatory death sentences for any particular crime than
endorse capital punishment in principle. 108 Many persons also say
that they would vote differently as jurors in capital cases than a logi-
cian might infer from their general views on the death penalty. 10 9
Moreover, the public has little interest in the details of capital pun-
ishment. The issue does not affect most people directly, and they
lack basic knowledge on many elementary aspects of the subject. 110
Perhaps ultimately the death penalty remains in force mostly as
a symbol of opposition to crime and disorder. Many Americans
seem more interested in simply having capital punishment on the
statute books than in necessarily seeing it carried out in any particu-
lar case. 1" The rule against executing the insane operates to re-
duce the class of persons subject to execution. In that sense, it too
has symbolic significance. From this perspective, the intellectual
difficulties of justifying and implementing the rule matter less than
the reaffirmation of a principle that diminishes our larger
ambivalence.
107 See, e.g., R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 7 n.23 (1982); F. CARRINGTON, NEITHER
CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 58-60 (1978); Recent Survey Research Data on the Death Penalty, in THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 85, 85-88 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter Recent Survey
Research Data]. For earlier public opinion data, see Erskine, The Polls: Capital Punishment,
34 PUB. Op. Q. 290 (1970).
108 See, e.g., Ellsworth & Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close Examination
of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 116, 126-37 (1983); Vid-
mar & Ellsworth, Research on Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 68, 71 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982). See also Recent Survey Research Data, supra note
107, at 89.
109 Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 108, at 83-84; Recent Survey Research Data, supra
note 107, at 90.
110 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 75, at 13; Ellsworth & Ross, supra note
108, at 139-45, 161; Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amend-
ment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 171, 184-87. These findings lend
support to Justice Marshall's suggestion that the public "know[s] almost nothing about
capital punishment." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362 (1972)(Marshall, J., concur-
ring). One ought not exaggerate the significance of this point, however. The level of
public knowledge on most issues is strikingly low. See, e.g., W. NEUMAN, THE PARADOX or
MASS PoLITIcS 14-17 (1986); Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 108, at 81 & nn.43-45.
111 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 75, at 10-15, 38-45; Ellsworth & Ross,
supra note 108, at 161-65. See also THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 68 (H. Bedau 3d ed.
1982). At the same time, the public does seem to want some executions to occur. See
supra note 103 and accompanying text. For example, the 1986 recall of three members
of the Supreme Court of California was stimulated in part by their consistent votes
against death sentences. See Thompson, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, Judi-
cial Elections, and the California Supreme Court: Defining the Terms of the Debate, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 809, 847-50 (1986).
